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Abstract
Any attempt to introduce probabilities into quantum mechanics faces difficulties
due to the mathematical structure of Hilbert space, as reflected in Birkhoff and von
Neumann’s proposal for a quantum logic. The (consistent or decoherent) histories
solution is provided by its single framework rule, an approach that includes conven-
tional (Copenhagen) quantum theory as a special case. Mermin’s Ithaca interpretation
addresses the same problem by defining probabilities which make no reference to a sam-
ple space or event algebra (“correlations without correlata”). But this leads to severe
conceptual difficulties, which almost inevitably couple quantum theory to unresolved
problems of human consciousness. Using histories allows a sharper quantum description
than is possible with a density matrix, suggesting that the latter provides an ensemble
rather than an irreducible single-system description as claimed by Mermin. The his-
tories approach satisfies the first five of Mermin’s desiderata for a good interpretation
of quantum mechanics, including Einstein locality, but the Ithaca interpretation seems
to have difficulty with the first (independence of observers) and the third (describing
individual systems).
1 Five Desiderata Plus One
David Mermin is widely acknowledged to be the prince of expositors in the field of quantum
interpretation. It is a pleasure to read what he writes, even when you don’t agree with it.
When it comes to his Ithaca interpretation of quantum mechanics(1, 2, 3), I actually agree with
five out of six of Mermin’s desiderata for a satisfactory interpretation (Sec. 2 of Ref. 1), and
before discussing some points of serious disagreement, let me indicate the areas of overlap.
Here are the five desiderata in Mermin’s own words, followed in each case by a selection from
his explanatory comments:
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1. The theory should describe an objective reality independent of observers and
their knowledge
. . . A satisfactory interpretation should be unambiguous about what has objec-
tive reality and what does not, and what is objectively real should be cleanly
separated from what is “known”. Indeed, knowledge should not enter at a fun-
damental level at all.
2. The concept of measurement should play no fundamental role
There is a world out there, whether or not we choose to poke at it, and it ought to
be possible to make unambiguous statements about the character of that world
that make no reference to such probes. A satisfactory interpretation of quantum
mechanics ought to make it clear why “measurement” keeps getting in the way of
straight talk about the natural world; “measurement” ought not to be a part of
that straight talk. Measurement should acquire meaning from the theory — not
vice versa. . . Physics ought to describe the unobserved unprepared world. “We”
shouldn’t have to be there at all.
3. The theory should describe individual systems — not just ensembles
The theory should describe individual systems because the world contains in-
dividual systems. . . and the theory ought to describe the world and its subsys-
tems. . . In a nondeterministic world probability has nothing to do with incom-
plete knowledge, and ought not to require an ensemble of systems for its inter-
pretation. . . The fact that physics cannot make deterministic predictions about
individual systems does not excuse us from pursuing the goal of being able to
describe them as they currently are.
4. The theory should describe small isolated systems without having to invoke
interactions with anything external
. . . I would like to have a quantum mechanics that does not require the existence
of a “classical domain”. Nor should it rely on quantum gravity, or radiation es-
caping to infinity, or interactions with an external environment for its conceptual
validity. . . It ought to be possible to deal with high precision and no conceptual
murkiness with small parts of the universe if they are to high precision isolated
from the rest.
5. Objectively real internal properties of an isolated individual system should not
change when something is done to another non-interacting system
. . . Einstein used [this] supposition, together with his intuitions about what con-
stituted a real factual situation, to conclude that quantum mechanics offers an
incomplete description of physical reality. I propose to explore the converse ap-
proach: assume that quantum mechanics does provide a complete description of
physical reality, insist on generalized Einstein-locality, and see how this constrains
what can be considered physically real.
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On these five desiderata I agree two hundred percent with Mermin. In some cases I may
be giving his words a slightly different interpretation from what he intended, but at least in
broad outline and probably in most of the details, I could not agree with him more, even
though I could not possibly have expressed it with such clarity and enthusiasm. But now
we come to the sixth desideratum:
6. It suffices (for now) to base the interpretation of quantum mechanics on the
(yet to be supplied) interpretation of objective probability
I am willing at least provisionally to base an interpretation of quantum mechanics
on primitive intuitions about the meaning of probability in individual systems.
Quantum mechanics has taught us that probability is more than just a way of
dealing systematically with out own ignorance, but a fundamental feature of the
physical world. But we do not yet understand objective probability. . . I maintain
that if we can make sense of quantum mechanics conditional upon making sense
of probability as an objective property of an individual system, then we will have
got somewhere. . .
The tone is different, and the bold confidence which characterized desiderata 1 to 5 has
changed into something more tentative. Mermin is not sure that this is the right way to
go, and I have even greater misgivings. Part of the problem is that I have had a great
deal of difficulty making sense of what he means by probability as an objective property of
an individual system. While I enjoyed reading the prose, distilling the essential idea out of
Refs. 1 and 2 was a chore. The main sticking point was the notion that there can be statistical
correlations among the properties of subsystems even if those properties have no objective
physical reality: “correlations without correlata”. When repeated reading did not make
things clear — something which for me is a common experience, though quite exceptional
for papers written by Mermin — I adopted the alternative approach of examining some of
the same problems from my own point of view, in hopes that by getting someplace using
my own methods I could better make sense of Mermin’s. The remainder of this paper is the
fruit of reflections of this sort.
There is a fundamental difficulty when one attempts to introduce probabilities into quan-
tum theory by a route other than appealing to measurement outcomes, something which both
Mermin and I consider unsatisfactory. As discussed in Sec. 2.1, the problem arises in trying
to relate the quantum Hilbert space, as interpreted by von Neumann,(4) to the sample space
structure required by ordinary probability theory. I then discuss some ways of handling
this problem, beginning with the quantum logic approach of Birkhoff and von Neumann(5)
in Sec. 2.2, followed in Sec. 3.1 by consistent or decoherent histories — which I simply re-
fer to as “histories”, since this will be unambiguous — as developed by Omne`s(6, 7, 8) and
me,(9, 10, 11, 12) with major assistance from Gell-Mann and Hartle.(13, 14) Next, in Sec. 3.2 I
comment on the successes and limitations of the measurement approach found in standard
textbook (“Copenhagen”) quantum mechanics, as seen from a histories perspective. Fol-
lowing this in Sec. 4 I return to the Ithaca interpretation, examining in turn each of its
two pillars, as defined by Mermin in Sec. 4 of Ref. 1: the absence of correlata despite the
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existence of correlations, which I take up in Sec. 4.1, and the density matrix as a fundamen-
tal objective and irreducible property of a subsystem, the subject of Sec. 4.2. In Sec. 5 I
respond to some comments by Mermin on the histories approach, and then summarize my
conclusions in Sec. 6.
2 Probabilities and Logic
2.1 The problem with quantum probability
According to Jammer (p. 38 of Ref. 15), Born proposed his probabilistic interpretation of
the Schro¨dinger wave function at about the same time that Schro¨dinger published the time-
dependent version of his equation. The fact that two of the most important principles of
modern quantum theory did not originate in the mind of a single genius may be one reason
why they have been so hard to combine. However, there is a much more fundamental
difficulty connected with the different mathematical structures used for quantum mechanics
and probability theory. Quantum theory employs a complex vector space with an inner
product, a Hilbert space. Probability theory is founded on the notion of a sample space (e.g.,
Ref. 16) of mutually exclusive possibilities, one and only one of which occurs, or is true, at
any given time, or in any given experimental run. Appropriate subsets of the sample space
make up an event algebra whose members are assigned probabilities. For example, if one
rolls a die the sample space consists of the six possible outcomes, and if one of these, say 5
spots, occurs, the others do not occur. The event that the number of spots is even belongs
to the event algebra, and is assigned a probability of 1/2 for an honest die.
P Q
Figure 1: The set of points P inside the circle correspond to the proposition P , the set Q
inside the square correspond to Q, the totality of points in the two regions corresponds to
P ∨Q, and the region of overlap to P ∧Q.
In classical statistical mechanics the sample space is the phase space of classical Hamil-
tonian dynamics, spanned by the coordinates and momenta of the different particles which
make up the system. If the mechanical system is correctly represented by one of these points
it is not represented by any of the others, so one has a set of mutually-exclusive possibilities.
Probabilities are then assigned to those subsets of points in the phase space that make up
the event algebra, in a way which satisfies the rules given in texts on probability theory. It
will be convenient to refer to such subsets as properties. For example the property P that
the energy is between 1 and 2 mJ corresponds to the subset of points P in the phase space
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for which P is true. Its negation P˜ , NOT P , corresponds to the complement ∼ P of the
set P in the phase space, the points for which P is false (i.e., the energy lies outside the
specified range). Given another property Q corresponding to a different set Q of points in
the phase space, the combined properties P AND Q, written P ∧Q, and P OR Q, written
P ∨Q, correspond to sets of points in the phase space which can be represented schematically
in a Venn diagram, Fig. 1. Thus in classical statistical mechanics there is a natural corre-
spondence between propositions used to describe the system and sets of points in the phase
space, and between logical operations on the propositions and set-theoretical operations on
the corresponding sets.
P
P⊥ Q
Figure 2: Two-dimensional Hilbert space represented schematically by the real plane, with
origin at the point where the rays intersect.
The reason for mentioning such elementary matters is that in quantum mechanics the
situation is very different if we interpret the quantum Hilbert space in the manner indicated
by von Neumann in Sec. 5 of Ch. III of Ref. 4. He associates propositions not with arbi-
trary collections of points, but instead with linear subspaces of the Hilbert space. (To be
precise, with closed linear subspaces; hereafter all such qualifications are left to the reader
sophisticated enough to know they are needed.) The simplest nontrivial linear subspace
is a ray consisting of all kets of the form {α|ψ〉}, where |ψ〉 is some fixed vector in the
space, and α is any complex number. One can think of this geometrically as an infinite line
through the origin, as in Fig. 2 where a two-dimensional complex Hilbert space is represented
schematically by its real counterpart. The point is that α|ψ〉 for α 6= 0 has precisely the
same physical significance as |ψ〉; the customary normalization of kets so that 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1 is
convenient but not essential, and the arbitrariness of the phase is simply the arbitrariness of
α when |α| = 1. The logical proposition P associated with a ray α|ψ〉 is just the assertion
that “the system is in the state |ψ〉”, whatever that may mean. For example, if |ψ〉 is a
nondegenerate energy eigenstate with energy E, we can interpret P as “the energy has the
value E”. As an example of a larger subspace, consider the proposition that the energy of
a harmonic oscillator is less than 3h¯ω. This corresponds to a three-dimensional subspace of
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the Hilbert space consisting of all linear combinations of the kets |0〉, |1〉, and |2〉, where |n〉
is the eigenstate with energy (n+ 1/2)h¯ω.
The differences between a quantum Hilbert space and a classical phase space begin to
appear when one considers the negation P˜ of a proposition P associated with a subspace P.
If we follow von Neumann, P˜ does not correspond to the complement ∼P of P, the set of
all vectors in the Hilbert space which do not belong to the subspace P, but rather to the
orthogonal complement P⊥ of P, the collection of all vectors |φ〉 with the property that |φ〉 is
orthogonal to every |ψ〉 in P in the sense that 〈φ|ψ〉=0. There are various reasons why this
is a sensible proposal. To begin with, P⊥ is a subspace of the Hilbert space, whereas ∼P
is not, so that if we want the negation of a property to itself be a property associated with
a subspace, we cannot use ∼ P. Second, what distinguishes a Hilbert space from any old
(complex) vector space is the existence of the inner product 〈φ|ψ〉, and since orthogonality
is a rather natural and fruitful concept from the mathematical point of view, one anticipates
that it ought to play a significant role in the physical interpretation. Third, if P is the
projector (orthogonal projection operator) onto P, then P˜ = I − P (with I the identity)
is the projector onto P⊥, and this way there is a nice analogy between quantum projectors
and indicator functions on the classical phase space; for details, see Sec. 4.4 of Ref. 12.
(Using the same symbol P for a proposition and the corresponding projector will cause no
confusion.) The reasons given thus far appeal to mathematical elegance, and I am sure this
had something to do with von Neumann’s choice. But is it physically reasonable? This
can only be discussed by considering physical examples. For instance, if P is the quantum
proposition that the energy of the oscillator is less than 3h¯ω, then its negation P˜ corresponds
to the subspace where the energy is greater than (or equal to, but it cannot be equal to)
3h¯ω. Is that reasonable? I think so, but (following a strategy I learned from Mermin) I
invite any reader who disagrees to come up with something better.
Why all this discussion of negation? Because it leads to a certain oddity visible in Fig. 2,
which shows one ray P as a solid line and its orthogonal complement P⊥ as a dashed line.
But there are many other rays, such as the dotted one labeled Q, each associated with a
quantum proposition. Both P and Q are rays, the smallest possible subspaces of the Hilbert
space (aside from the origin, which does not represent a physical property), and therefore
they are the quantum counterparts of points in a classical phase space. But in a classical
phase space, either two points coincide, or each lies in the complement of the other, so that
either they mean the same thing, or else the truth of one implies the falsity of the other. Now
P and Q in Fig. 2 clearly do not mean the same thing, but Q does not lie in the subspace P⊥
corresponding to the negation of P, nor P in the subspace corresponding to the negation of
Q, so the truth of one does not imply that the other is false. Thus if we follow von Neumann
in associating subspaces and their orthogonal complements with quantum propositions and
their negations, an oddity emerges in terms of nonorthogonal rays, which have a nonclassical
relationship to each other. To put the matter another way, it is only orthogonal quantum
states which are distinct in the same sense that two different classical states, corresponding
to different points in the classical phase space, are distinct.
It helps to have a term to describe the relationship between rays such as P and Q in
Fig. 2, which are neither identical nor orthogonal, and we shall call them incompatible. Two
6
rays are incompatible if and only if the corresponding projectors do not commute with each
other (which means that incompatibility is very much a quantum notion). Similarly, two
arbitrary subspaces, or their projectors, or the corresponding propositions, are incompatible
if and only if the projectors do not commute. Otherwise they are compatible. Quantum
incompatibility in this technical sense should be clearly distinguished from the relationship
of being mutually exclusive. Two classical propositions which are mutually exclusive stand
in a relationship such that the truth of one implies the falsity of the other. In the quantum
case two subspaces or propositions or projectors are mutually exclusive if the projectors
are orthogonal to each other in the sense that their product (in either order; it makes no
difference) is zero.
As mentioned previously, ordinary (classical) probability theory is based upon the notion
of a sample space of mutually-exclusive events. It is quite clear what this means in terms of
subsets of the phase space: they are mutually exclusive if they do not overlap, if they have
no points in common. But what should one do in the quantum case, where, as we have seen,
there are rays in the Hilbert space which are not identical but also not distinct, at least in
the same sense that nonidentical classical things are distinct? Choosing a sample space is a
fairly trivial matter in classical physics. (Well, not exactly, but by now the rules have been
worked out and the experts can explain Borel sets to you.) But in quantum physics it is
far from trivial, because you have to decide what to do with incompatible subspaces. This
is a fundamental problem facing anyone who wants to introduce probabilities into quantum
mechanics in a consistent fashion, at least if these probabilities are to obey the usual rules
of probability theory. To be sure, that may be too restrictive. Perhaps what is needed
in quantum theory is a new theory of probability, with different rules. In that case the
fundamental problem is to find new rules which are mathematically consistent and make
physical sense. In any event, there is a nontrivial problem.
2.2 Quantum logic
Since von Neumann was a skilled mathematician, it would be surprising had he overlooked
the odd effects of his scheme for associating quantum propositions and their negations with
subspaces of the Hilbert space. He didn’t, and in a 1936 paper(5) — one much less cited
than the 1935 paper of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen,(17) though in my opinion it is equally
important — he and Garrett Birkhoff tackled the problem of the relationship between in-
compatible propositions by suggesting that their conjunction P AND Q, P ∧Q, be associated
with the intersection P ∩ Q of the corresponding subspaces of the Hilbert space. This is a
natural choice in that the same operation, the intersection of two sets, is appropriate for a
classical phase space, and because the intersection of two (closed) subspaces of the Hilbert
space is another (closed) subspace. In the case of compatible (PQ = QP ) propositions this
leads to no problems, but if one also adopts it for incompatible propositions, the result is a
logical peculiarity.
Rather than an abstract discussion, let us consider a two-dimensional Hilbert space rep-
resenting the spin angular momentum of a spin-half particle. Let P project on the ray P
in Fig. 2 passing through the ket |z+〉, corresponding to the property that the z component
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of angular momentum Sz is equal to +1/2 (in units of h¯). Its negation P˜ is the property
Sz = −1/2. Let Q project on the ray Q passing through |x
+〉, corresponding to the propo-
sition Sx = +1/2 for the x component of angular momentum, with negation Sx = −1/2.
In Birkhoff and von Neumann’s quantum logic P ∧Q corresponds to the intersection of the
rays P and Q, which is the origin or zero vector of the Hilbert space. This represents the
proposition that is always false; it is the quantum counterpart of the empty subset of the
points of a classical phase space.
One’s initial reaction is that calling Sz = +1/2 AND Sx = +1/2 always false represents
good physics. We know, or at least we were taught, that there is no way in which one can
simultaneously measure both Sz and Sx for a spin-half particle, and if Sz = +1/2 AND
Sx = +1/2 could ever be true, then surely some clever experimentalist would have figured
out a way to check it, and by now would have received a Nobel prize. However, there is a
problem. Logic tells us that the negation of a proposition that is always false is a proposition
that is always true. The negation of Sz = +1/2 AND Sx = +1/2, following the usual rules,
is Sz = −1/2 OR Sx = −1/2. Is it always true that either Sz = −1/2 or Sx = −1/2 or both?
Let’s consider a case in which Sz = +1/2, so its negation Sz = −1/2 is not true. Are we
entitled to conclude that if Sz = +1/2, then it is always the case that Sx = −1/2? But that
contradicts the fact (at least in the Birkhoff and von Neumann scheme) that Sz = +1/2 AND
Sx = −1/2 is always false, for precisely the same reason that Sz = +1/2 AND Sx = +1/2 is
always false.
When you reach a contradiction in this fashion, the first thing to do is to go back and
check that you have not made some silly mistake, and if that doesn’t solve the difficulty, you
suspect that one of your assumptions is wrong. But there is a third way, and this is what
Birkhoff and von Neumann proposed: change the rules of logic! Their paper made the quite
specific proposal that one abandon, or at least modify, the distributive identities, that is
P ∧ (Q ∨ R) = (P ∧Q) ∨ (P ∧ R) (1)
and its counterpart with ∧ and ∨ interchanged. This proposal and variations on the same
theme have given rise to a considerable body of literature. A quarter of a century ago
Jammer (Ch. 8 of Ref. 15) said that the Birkhoff and von Neumann proposal had given rise
to a lot of discussion among the philosophers, but very little interest among the physicists.
That situation has not changed, and I think it regrettable. Not because the Birkhoff and
von Neumann scheme solves the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics, but rather
because — and it is in this respect that their work has a parallel with Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen — it raises a significant issue, a problem that needs to be thought about. There
are important logical issues lurking in the foundations of quantum mechanics, and ignoring
them, or treating them with contempt, does not make them go away. Indeed, it might just
be the case — let me be honest, I think it is the case — that paying more attention to logical
issues would speed up the resolution of the difficulties raised by Einstein and his colleagues.
To be sure, our immediate concern is with probabilities, not logic. But the structure
of ordinary probability theory, in particular the sample space and event algebra, is closely
linked with propositional logic, which is in some sense a limiting case of probability theory,
with probabilities 1 and 0 the counterparts of TRUE and FALSE. Thus any attempt to base
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quantum probabilities on the quantum logic of Birkhoff and von Neumann, or the various
variants that have appeared since, will require a new set of rules.
3 Histories and Measurements
3.1 Quantum histories
One might also think of the (consistent or decoherent) histories approach to quantum inter-
pretation as constituting a revised logic, but if so it is a much more conservative revision
than that proposed by Birkhoff and von Neumann. For it requires no modification of the
rules of propositional logic, or of ordinary probability theory, provided — and here is where
conservatism comes in — one strictly limits the domain of discourse, the set of things which
can sensibly be said about a quantum system, in an appropriate way.
Again, the example of a spin-half particle is useful for illustrating what this does and
does not mean. At least under some circumstances it is reasonable to say of such a particle
that Sz = +1/2, because there is a corresponding ray in the quantum Hilbert space, so
a statement of this sort is consistent with quantum mathematics as interpreted by von
Neumann. Similarly, it is (sometimes) reasonable to say that Sx = +1/2, or that Sw = +1/2
where w denotes any direction in space. On the other hand, Sz = +1/2 AND Sx = +1/2
is a meaningless statement, for there is nothing in the Hilbert space that could conceivably
correspond to it. Every ray signifies Sw = +1/2 for some direction w, and there are none left
over to represent a proposition with AND in it of the sort we are considering. At first it might
seem as as if calling Sz = +1/2 AND Sx = +1/2 meaningless is the same as saying that it
is always false, and in ordinary language there is, indeed, not much difference between the
two. However, the negation of a false but meaningful statement is a true statement, whereas
the negation of a meaningless statement is equally meaningless, neither true nor false. The
sense of “meaningless” employed here is the same as when in ordinary logic one combines
two meaningful propositions P and Q in the form P ∧ ∨Q. Such an expression does not
conform to the rules given in books on logic for forming meaningful sentences, and hence it
is a waste of time discussing what it means, whether it is true or false, or what its negation
might be.
What the histories approach does is specify that a proper domain of logical discourse in
quantum theory is limited to a set of compatible propositions corresponding to subspaces with
projectors that commute with each other. Within such a framework (my terminology) or
logic (Omne`s) all the usual rules of (classical!) propositional logic work just fine, without the
slightest modification. Logicians know, and the books on logic tell us, that logical reasoning
requires a well-defined domain of discourse or collection of propositions (the well-formed
sentences, or whatever), and that specifying this collection is a task, sometimes a nontrivial
one, which needs to be done before you draw your conclusions. We physicists, amateurs
in this as in every other field outside our specialty, are inclined to plunge ahead and leave
the mathematical or logical niceties to some future paper or (more often) to someone else.
Frequently we get away with it, but not always, and if Omne`s and I are right, quantum
mechanics is one case in which it pays to pay attention to what you are doing.
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In classical physics we do not have to be specific about the domain of discourse, because
in most instances only one reasonable possibility will come to the mind of a trained physicist,
so there is no point spending time at the beginning of a conversation or a paper stating what
it is. As soon as I mention the angular momentum of a spinning top, you know precisely what
the phase space is, so you know what constitutes a meaningful description. On the other
hand, in quantum mechanics there are always many different frameworks (logics) to choose
from. You might be interested in talking about the z component of angular momentum of a
spin-half particle, in which case you use the Sz framework corresponding to the orthonormal
basis |z+〉, |z−〉. These represent two mutually-exclusive possibilities, because the product of
the corresponding projectors [z+][z−] is zero, where [ψ] is a convenient shorthand for |ψ〉〈ψ|,
and so they constitute a sample space suitable for a probabilistic description of the system.
On the other hand, if you are interested in the x component of the particle’s spin you use the
Sx framework with projectors [x
+] and [x−]. The Sz and Sx frameworks are incompatible:
they are logically disjoint, you cannot combine propositions from one in a meaningful way
with propositions from another.
More generally, a possible framework for discussing a quantum system at a single time
always corresponds to a decomposition of the identity, a collection of projectors that commute
with one another and sum to the identity I. They represent mutually exclusive possibilities,
since the product of any two (distinct) projectors belonging to the collection is zero. These
projectors together with sums of two or more of them constitute the collection of propositions
that make sense in this framework. Two frameworks are compatible if the projectors in one
commute with the projectors in the other; otherwise they are incompatible. To describe
a quantum system developing in time you use a framework consisting of histories : each
history is a sequence of projectors representing properties of the system at a succession of
times. The rules for constructing frameworks of histories are more complicated than those
for describing a quantum system at a single time, and in fact there has been some diversity
in the proposed rules, although in the end most of us seem to have settled on a formulation
due to Gell-Mann and Hartle.(14) A given framework, either for the properties of a quantum
system at a single time or for a collection of histories, is a collection of commuting projectors,
and the corresponding logical propositions relate to one another in precisely the same way
as in familiar, classical logic. For this reason, introducing probabilities is no problem: one
simply follows the usual rules of probability theory, and all the usual rules are satisfied, as
long as the discussion is confined to a single framework.
But then, how are we to relate the propositions or the probabilities that occur in different,
incompatible frameworks? To this Omne`s and I have a simple answer: don’t! This is
stated more formally in the single framework rule. It says that propositions belonging to
incompatible frameworks cannot be combined in any way, shape, or form when constructing
a meaningful description of the quantum world. At one level the single framework rule agrees
pretty well with the quantum physicist’s intuition. Talking about a particle which is in an
energy eigenstate of a harmonic oscillator AND has a position associated with it, or has a
position at the same time as it has a momentum, or a spin half particle with values for both
Sx AND Sz — these things make us uncomfortable. So it is nice to have a rule which gives
a reason — the projectors for the two items don’t commute with each other — for not doing
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what would in any case make us nervous. But there is another level at which the rule is
much less intuitive. This is when a projector P for some property that interests us belongs
to two different, incompatible (because some other projectors do not commute) frameworks
F1 and F2. We have just used F1 to compute a probability for P , and what could be more
reasonable than to suppose that P must have the same probability in F2? Indeed, how could
it possibly be otherwise? This sort of reasoning leads to all manner of paradoxes, and it is
by insisting on the single framework rule that the histories approach avoids or, as I like to
put it, tames these paradoxes (see Chs. 20 to 25 of Ref. 12).
The single framework rule has been frequently misunderstood, so it may be worth mak-
ing a couple of brief comments about what it does and does not mean. First, it is not a
prohibition on creating quantum descriptions using any and every framework which strikes
your fancy. You can talk about, and it makes sense to talk about, Sz or Sx or whatever
you please. What is prohibited is combining incompatible frameworks, thinking of them as
somehow both referring to the same system at the same time. Second, the relationship of
two incompatible frameworks is not that they are mutually exclusive, that if one is true
the other must be false. We have already seen that this is the wrong way (at least if you
accept von Neumann’s notion of negation) of viewing two incompatible propositions, and it
is equally wrong when it comes to incompatible frameworks. It is useless to search for some
“law of nature” which identifies the “right” framework for describing a quantum situation,
because alternative frameworks are not related in this fashion. I shall have more to say
about this later.
In summary, the histories approach requires reasoning in a different way about quantum
systems than we are accustomed to doing in the case of classical systems, and in this sense
requires a “new logic”. However, what is new is not modus ponens or the rule of the excluded
middle. Instead it is a syntactical rule that specifies which quantum descriptions make sense,
and imposes the painful discipline (slightly less painful when you get used to it) of paying
attention to what constitutes a meaningful domain of discourse. There are some significant
benefits from exercising discipline. One is that you can think clearly about what is going on
in a quantum system without running into logical paradoxes. Next, quantum probabilities
can be manipulated using exactly the same rules as for their classical counterparts. Third,
all those mysterious nonlocal influences are eliminated from quantum theory: they owe their
existence to logical errors, and correcting these errors banishes them from the scene.
3.2 Quantum measurements
I am in complete agreement with Mermin’s desideratum 2, that the concept of measure-
ments should play no fundamental role in quantum interpretation, and consequently I share
his dissatisfaction with the “Copenhagen” interpretation, understood to mean the ideas of
Bohr and the other founding fathers as these have come down to us in the textbooks and
lectures from which we first learned the subject. Nonetheless, one must admit that the
Copenhagen has been remarkably successful in introducing at least some probabilities into
quantum theory, namely those referring to the outcomes of measurements, and it seems
worth investigating, using various frameworks of the sort introduced in Sec. 3.1, the reasons
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for its success, and what are its limitations.
One of the many possible frameworks that can be used to analyze the time development
of a quantum system is what I shall call a unitary framework: let |Ψt〉 be a solution of
Schro¨dinger’s equation, and at any time let the projector [Ψt] onto |Ψt〉 be part of the
decomposition of the identity used to describe what is going on. Consider a situation in
which a measurement is about to take place, and at the initial time t0 let |Ψ0〉 represent
the “ready” state of the apparatus and that of the system it will soon be measuring. Let
|Ψ1〉 be the resulting state at t1 when the measurement interaction has taken place. As
Schro¨dinger(18) himself taught us, one can easily imagine an initial |Ψ0〉 which is physically
reasonable, but develops into a monstrosity |Ψ1〉 that I like to call a macroscopic quantum
superposition (MQS), but everyone else refers to as “Schro¨dinger’s cat”, because it is a
superposition of states in which the apparatus pointer indicating the outcomes has various
different positions. The quantum historian will admit he does not understand |Ψ1〉 any better
than you do, but will add that if you insist that this represents the physical state of the total
system at time t1 — that is, if you are using the unitary framework — then anything else
you want to say about the system at this time must be expressed in terms of projectors
which commute with the projector [Ψ1] onto |Ψ1〉. In particular, you certainly cannot speak
about a pointer pointing in a particular direction (or a cat which is dead or alive), because
whatever projector could be employed for this purpose will not commute with [Ψ1]. The
situation is analogous to asserting that Sz = +1/2 and then trying to ascribe values to Sx.
It makes no sense.
As seen from a histories perspective, what theorists trained in Copenhagen actually do
when they calculate measurement outcomes is to use what I call the dragon framework, after
Wheeler’s striking image of the great smoky dragon(20) which at some instant bites the de-
tector, at which point the dragon collapses, to be replaced by a well-defined pointer position.
In histories language, unitary time development is employed up to just before t1, but then
one introduces a physically reasonable (or at least interpretable) pointer decomposition of
the Hilbert space identity into subspaces (projectors) such that in each of then the pointer
has a well-defined position. Constructing such a decomposition is in principle not too dif-
ficulty, since any two states of affairs which are distinguishable at a macroscopic level will
be represented by quantum projectors whose product is (essentially) zero, and thus we have
a good sample space of mutually exclusive possibilities. This framework and the unitary
framework constitute equally valid but mutually incompatible ways of describing quantum
time development, so it makes no sense to combine them, and you will only confuse yourself
if you think of them as equivalent for all practical purposes or, indeed, for any purposes
whatsoever. (In saying this I am siding with Bell(21) in his critique of an earlier Ithaca
interpretation, Sec. 20 of Ref. 22.) Note that just as the unitary framework excludes any
discussion of the probabilities of measurement outcomes, in the same way using the dragon
framework excludes any discussion of the MQS states of different pointer positions once you
have introduced the pointer decomposition of the identity. The precise time at which the
dragon collapses is a choice that is up the to the quantum physicist; indeed, there are many
different (incompatible) dragon frameworks, and since there is no “right” framework, there is
also no point in discussing when it is that the collapse occurs. To put it another way, collapse
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is something that occurs in the theorist’s notebook, not the experimentalist’s laboratory.
But if collapse can be pushed around in time, is there any reason that it cannot be pushed
back to shortly before the measurement takes place? No there is not, and if you do this you
arrive at what I shall call the measurement framework in which just before the measurement
takes place the soon-to-be-measured system actually has the property corresponding to the
after-the-measurement-occurs pointer position. That means the measurement is actually a
measurement! One of the few idiocies to escape Bell’s scathing criticisms(21) of the Copen-
hagen measurement approach is that it is not a theory of measurement in any reasonable
sense of the word. Ordinary macroscopic measurements, such as the height of a table, tell
one a property of the measured system both before and after the measurement takes place.
Typical measurements of properties of quantum entities in the laboratory, such as the energy
of an alpha particle, tell one what the property was before it was, often quite severely, altered
by its interaction with the measuring apparatus. A quantum theory of measurement that
can tell us the probability of a pointer position, but is incapable of relating that position to
some earlier state of affairs is of no use for analyzing the experimental data that accumulates
so rapidly at particle accelerators! Despite the prominence it receives in textbooks, the von
Neumann theory of measurement, Ch. VI of Ref. 4, in which a property of the measured
system after the measurement takes place is correlated with the position of a pointer in-
dicating the outcome of the measurement, is actually of very limited utility for discussing
what actually goes on in the laboratory. However, in those circumstances in which it can be
(properly) applied there is also a framework which justifies the usual conclusions in terms of
conditional probabilities; for details, see Sec. 18.2 of Ref. 12.
The measurement framework is one step in the right direction, but what particle exper-
imentalists actually use when designing their equipment and analyzing their data is what I
shall call the practical framework in which a particle described quantum mechanically moves
along what on macroscopic length scales is a classical trajectory from the point where it
was produced (or scattered) towards whatever detector eventually detects it. And if it is
detected at some point, you know that a short time earlier it was headed toward that point
and not in some other direction. The practical framework, let me emphasize, provides a fully
quantum-mechanical description of what is going on, and it justifies the usual phenomeno-
logical talk in which particles possess certain properties before a measurement takes place, or
in the complete absence of any measurement. It also indicates the limits of validity of such
talk: why, for example, you may (but will not always) be in trouble if your description says
that the neutron passed through a definite arm of the interferometer. The histories approach
justifies (at least most of the time) the intuitive belief of experimental physicists that they
are dealing with real particles moving along in the manner they have been accustomed to
talking about. For more on this topic see Ref. 23 and pp. 123ff of Ref. 7.
In summary, the main defect of Copenhagen, viewed from the histories perspective, is
not what it says about measurement outcomes and their probabilities, which can be readily
justified using the fully-consistent histories interpretation, but rather its inability to push
further and relate measurement outcomes to the microscopic properties which are being
measured. In practice physicists who deal with real measurements tend to believe that they
are really measuring something: they talk as if the “measurata”, or whatever term Mermin
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approves, really exist. (For a few examples of situations where this sort of talk is reasonable,
see Sec. 3 of Ref. 9, Sec. 4.1 of Ref. 7, and Sec. IV of Ref. 23.) The histories approach, unlike
Copenhagen, tells us why quantum mechanics, properly interpreted, justifies this belief.
One can also view the matter in a different way. Restricting the discussion to macroscopic
measurement outcomes, which is really what the great smoky dragon amounts to, is an
example of limiting the domain of logical discourse in a manner consistent with the single
framework rule. Sticking to macroscopic events as they occur in the world around us is a
safe thing to do because, as seen quantum-mechanically, the macroscopic “classical” limit
can always be described using a single quasi-classical framework — more on this at the end
of Sec. 4.1. It is safe, but it is inadequate, for physicists need to be able to discuss the
microscopic world in a physically meaningful way; we need to talk about particles and spins
and such things. Quantum mechanics interpreted using the single framework rule allows us
to do this without getting into contradictions.
4 The Ithaca Pillars
4.1 Correlations without correlata
The first pillar of the Ithaca interpretation is objective probability, the notion that correlations
(more generally, probabilities) are the only fundamental and objective properties of the
world. The term “objective” could mean various things. One is that quantum mechanics
provides specific rules for calculating probabilities, e.g., the probability that at the end of
the measurement the apparatus pointer will be directed at 2 rather than 1, and that two
physicists who accept the principles of the theory and start with the same initial state
will assign the same values. It is not a matter of subjective judgments, of saying “my
hunch is the chance of its happening is less than 1/2.” If “objective” is understood in
this sense, most quantum physicists would probably say our probabilities are objective. An
alternative interpretation could be that quantum dynamics is intrinsically stochastic rather
than deterministic, and this is an objective fact about the world. Many, though not all,
quantum physicists would agree.
But Mermin seems to have something different in mind, since he refers to objective prob-
ability as an irreducible feature of the world, not linked in any way with human ignorance.
Consider an example. Just before a coin is tossed I assign a probability of 1/2 to each out-
come, but after it has been tossed and I have seen the outcome, I assign a definite value, H
or T . In this case the earlier uncertainty has been reduced, the earlier probability replaced by
a new one conditioned on new data. You can also imagine a quantum coin toss in which H
and T correspond to which of two photomultipliers detects a photon which has just passed
through a beam splitter. In any case, after the toss he who knows what happened knows
more than he who does not know. I think Mermin intends his objective probability to be
something that cannot be reduced in this way, perhaps like a coin which is still spinning, so
it really does not make sense to say H or T .
In particular, Mermin asserts that correlations between subsystems of a quantum system
are real and objective. By this he means joint probabilities of the form Pr(A,B), where A
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is some property (projector) associated with subsystem A and B a property of subsystem
B, when the total system has a Hilbert space A ⊗ B, and their generalizations to three or
more subsystems. If B is equal to the identity, Pr(A,B) becomes the probability Pr(A) of
A by itself without reference to the other subsystem B, so this is included in what Mermin
refers to as a “correlation”. And since any system to which anyone except a cosmologist
applies quantum mechanics can be thought of as part of a larger universe, it seems to me
that Mermin is asserting the objective reality of all quantum probabilities of the type
Pr(E) = 〈Ψ|E|Ψ〉, (2)
where E is any projector on the Hilbert space, and |Ψ〉 is the quantum state of the total
system. There are, to be sure, passages where he stresses the notion of a subsystem, but I
think most if not all of what he wants say about objective probabilities can be formulated
without reference to subsystems, and is a bit clearer in this more general framework. In
further support of this idea is the fact that Mermin does not care how one splits the Hilbert
space up into subsystems, which if it can be done at all can be done in a large (uncountably
infinite) number of ways. Adding a bit of casuistry, any Hilbert space is the tensor product
of itself with the one-dimensional Hilbert space of complex numbers, and in this sense it is
its own subsystem. Anyway, I shall proceed on the assumption that the subsystem structure
as such is not central to “correlations without correlata”, which is basically equivalent to
“probabilities without an event algebra”.
In everyday life we do not normally think of probabilities as things that exist, or at
least their existence is less real than their referents, the states of affairs of which they are
probabilities. Saying the probability is 1/2 that the coin toss will result in H is an abstract
notion whose significance has long been debated. But the referent, the actual outcome of the
toss, is part of the real world, and can have significant consequences, as when it determines
which team has the ball when the game begins. So Mermin’s including correlations, which
is to say probabilities, among real things, among what Bell would have called quantum
beables, is surprising. But what is truly astounding is his claim that while (at least some)
quantum probabilities are real, their referents are not part of physical reality. While Pr(A)
(or Pr(A,B) if one considers subsystems as essential) is an objective, real property, A (or
A and B) does not exist. This is a truly radical approach to quantum interpretation, and
one’s first inclination is to dismiss it as unintelligible nonsense.
But Mermin is not some antiscientific crank, and other reputable scholars have suggested
that quantum theory requires a radical revision of our view of reality, even to the point of
abandoning conventional logic (Sec. 2.2). So let us try and understand what in the (quantum)
world has driven Mermin to this (seemingly) crazy conclusion. The key passage is Sec. IX
of Ref. 2 where, as in App. B of Ref. 1, Mermin discusses Hardy’s paradox.(24) Elsewhere
Mermin(25) gives us his own lights-and-switches version, and I strongly recommend it to
anyone who wants to get a feeling for what is genuinely paradoxical about Hardy’s paradox.
There is no need to repeat it here, for one can get to the crucial logical and probabilistic
issues without making reference to a particular physical setup. In a four-dimensional Hilbert
space, A, B, C, and D are four appropriately chosen properties, each a projector onto a 2-
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dimensional subspace.1 The pairs
AC 6= CA, BD 6= DB (3)
do not commute, whereas A commutes with B and D, as does C. The negations are A˜ =
I − A, B˜, C˜, and D˜.
For a particular, carefully chosen |Ψ〉, probabilities are assigned using (2), and one finds
that
Pr(A, B˜) = 0,
Pr(B, C˜) = 0,
Pr(C, D˜) = 0,
Pr(A, D˜) > 0.
(4)
Here Pr(A, B˜) is the probability of A AND B˜, obtained by setting E = AB˜ in (2); AB˜ is a
projector because A and B˜ commute, and the same is true for the other products needed in
(4).
A B C D
Figure 3: Venn diagram to illustrate (4).
There is something odd about this collection of probabilities as one can see by looking
at the Venn diagram in Fig. 3 for the set of all points in the sample space (think of it as
discrete) with probability greater than zero. The points inside circle A are all the ones (of
positive probability) for which A is true, those inside B (including those inside A) the ones
for which B is true, and so forth. That A lies inside B follows from the fact that B˜ is the
set of points outside B, and the first equality in (4) tells us that this set has no points in
common with A. In the same way the other equalities tell us that B lies inside C, which lies
inside D. Hence, as evident from the figure, A has no points in common with D˜, the set of
points outside D. But this contradicts the final inequality in (4).
What is wrong? Let us first analyze the situation using the histories approach, which
demands that sample spaces be specified before probabilities can be defined. Since nothing
1The translation to Mermin’s notation in Sec. IX of Ref. 3 is as follows: A = 2′G, A˜ = 2′R, B = 1R,
B˜ = 1G, C = 1′G, C˜ = 1′R, D = 2R, D˜ = 2G.
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has been said in advance, the sample space of Pr(A, B˜) must be specified implicitly by the
fact that the corresponding event algebra contains A and B˜. Since A commutes with B, and
therefore B˜, there is such an event algebra, which contains negations, thus A˜ and B, and
conjunctions, such as A∧B corresponding to the projector AB. The result is a unique sample
space associated with a particular orthonormal basis of the four-dimensional Hilbert space,
with the basis vectors representing four mutually-exclusive possibilities. Similarly, each of
the other probabilities in (4) corresponds to a particular orthonormal basis or sample space
for which the corresponding probability makes sense. It turns out that the four different
bases associated with the four probabilities in (4) are all distinct, so each probability refers
to a different sample space. This is also obvious from (3), since one cannot combine sample
spaces containing noncommuting projectors. And this, says the historian, explains what is
wrong with our argument based on the Venn diagram in Fig. 3: it assumed a single sample
space. Hence the contradiction was a product of careless reasoning: you cannot combine
probabilities referring to different sample spaces.
While this noncombination rule is equally valid for classical and quantum physics, in
the former it can usually be ignored, because behind one’s probabilistic reasoning there is
always a single sample space. Even if it has not been explicitly identified, the fact that all
probabilities refer to this single sample space means that no contradictions of the type we
are considering can arise. But in quantum mechanics there is not always a single sample
space. Ignoring the rules can then lead to trouble, as in the present example, which can
be thought of as a probabilistic analog of the mistake a beginning student makes when he
carelessly assumes that in quantum theory xp and px are the same because they are the
same in classical mechanics.
Mermin’s argument follows a slightly different route. First, using the fact that Pr(A),
Pr(B) and Pr(C) are greater than zero, he uses Pr(B |A) = Pr(A,B)/Pr(A), etc., to rewrite
(4) in the equivalent form
Pr(B |A) = 1,
Pr(C |B) = 1,
Pr(D |C) = 1,
Pr(D |A) < 1.
(5)
Logically combining the first three equalities leads to the conclusion that Pr(D |A) = 1,
which contradicts the final inequality. From the fact that he deduced a contradiction using
conditional probabilities, Mermin draws the conclusion that while the joint probabilities such
as Pr(A, B˜) make sense, conditional probabilities such as Pr(B |A) do not make sense. And
since Pr(B |A), the probability of B given A, makes no sense, this can only be because A is
not “given”, that is, it is not part of physical reality.
The preceding sentence is a paraphrase of what Mermin says in the third to last paragraph
of Sec. IX of Ref. 2. He words it a little differently, making use of the fact that A is, in
his rendering of Hardy’s paradox, a property associated with a subsystem, and from this
concludes that there is something suspicious about properties of subsystems. But since the
analysis given above makes no reference to subsystems, I think Mermin’s reasoning ought
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to exclude from physical reality any quantum property (subspace, projector) which might
conceivably be a participant in a similar sort of argument leading to a contradiction. It seems
unfair to limit attention to properties that refer to subsystems or properties that can serve
as conditions inside conditional probabilities. In any case it seems likely, given that a system
can be split into subsystems in various ways, etc., that few interesting properties (0 and I are
uninteresting properties) will escape banishment into nonexistence. Hence it seems to me
that, modulo one or two unimportant nuances, Mermin’s “correlations without correlata”
asserts the existence of any probability Pr(E) of the form (2), along with the nonexistence
of every E. In probabilistic terms, the probabilities exist, but there is no sample space or
event algebra.
This is a rather startling solution (assuming it is one) to the problem of introducing prob-
abilities into quantum mechanics. Notice that the contradiction requires the noncommutivity
in (3), for otherwise quantum probabilities assigned using (2) obey all the usual rules of prob-
ability theory. Therefore what one encounters in Hardy’s paradox, formulated in this way,
is the basic logical problem pointed out by Birkhoff and von Neumann, Sec. 2.2, manifested
in the fact that the usual rules for probabilities don’t work the way they should. It is useful
to compare Mermin’s solution to this problem with those discussed earlier. Birkhoff and
von Neumann allow all propositions, all projectors, to be part of a single logical structure,
and get rid of contradictions of the sort Mermin (or Hardy) have discovered by appropriate
alterations of the rules of logic. The histories approach with its single framework rule denies
the validity of certain logical combinations which Birkhoff and von Neumann would allow,
and thereby preserves classical rules of reasoning on appropriately circumscribed domains
of discourse. Mermin’s solution is to abolish the entire logical structure based on subspaces
of the Hilbert space, or at least deny that this has anything to do with the physical world.
I know of no other quantum interpretation which even comes even close to this in terms
of pure philosophical audacity. The Birkhoff and von Neumann scheme of merely revising
propositional logic is rather tame compared with a proposal to abandon it altogether when
dealing with the quantum world!
I find Mermin’s proposal to be at least an implicit endorsement of the idea, which quan-
tum historians share with Birkhoff and von Neumann, that the conceptual problems of
quantum mechanics are fundamentally logical problems, that is to say, they arise because at
least some of the rules of reasoning with which we are familiar in everyday life break down,
do not apply, or need to be changed in some way when we come to the quantum domain.
There is a sense in which the great revolutions of modern science consist in calling into
question principles which at least since the time of the ancient Greeks have been regarded
as self-evident, obviously and universally true, and showing that they are only approxima-
tions, or only apply in a limited domain. The geocentric universe, the fixity of species, the
absolute nature of time, the validity of Euclid’s geometry for describing the world. Why
should the rules of reasoning be an exception? My answer to Mermin’s question, “What is
quantum mechanics trying to tell us?” (the title of Ref. 2), is that in the quantum world we
have located the limits of validity of the propositional logic which scientists have applied so
successfully in the classical world. Thus we need to formulate new rules.
The trouble with Mermin’s audacious solution to the logical problem, in my opinion, is
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that it goes much too far. It is throwing out the baby with the bath water, or sawing off the
branch on which you are seated, to express my dismay in hackneyed phrases that good writers
like Mermin would avoid. Having gotten rid of the properties or propositions he thought
were the source of the trouble, the result is a conceptual structure that lacks significance.
How does one attach any meaning to a probability without a referent, to Pr(A) when A is
meaningless? How does one distinguish it from the numerically-different probability Pr(B)
of the equally meaningless B?
Another approach to understanding Mermin, which seems initially more plausible, is that
A has a symbolic or mathematical meaning, so that Pr(A) is the “probability associated with
symbol A”, and hence can take on a different value from the probability Pr(B) associated
with symbol B, even though A and B have nothing to do with the real world. Theoretical
physicists sometimes use abstract symbols whose physical contents is not clear — think of
Feynman diagrams in field theory — but which can be manipulated according to well-defined
rules and used to calculate things, such as cross sections, which have a closer connection with
the real world. Perhaps for Mermin the nonexistent referents of his probabilities play this
role, as on the right side of (2). But then what am I to make of the left side? Can Pr(E)
be checked experimentally, and if so how? Normally probabilities are checked by repeating
an experiment many times and looking at the ensemble of outcomes. But Mermin rejects
ensembles, see Sec. III of Ref. 2, as a way of interpreting his probabilities. At the end of the
day I have to acknowledge that I am unable to make sense of his objective probabilities, and
I fear that Mermin may be in the same situation; some of his remarks in Secs. II and III of
Ref. 2 point in that direction.
A second problem with Mermin’s proposal, or maybe it is a different aspect of the prob-
lem just discussed, is its macroscopic or classical or “correspondence” limit. I think it leads,
almost inevitably, into a quagmire called “consciousness”, and for this reason does not sat-
isfy his desideratum 1 as I interpret it. Before giving reasons, I should say a few words
about my own position on the proper relationship of quantum physics and consciousness
research. I think the two need to be firmly disentangled. This could be done by producing
a correspondence limit for quantum theory which makes sense of the entities which chemists
and biologists are constantly talking about — molecules, proteins, cells, what have you —
in quantum terms, one which explains why such talk is reasonable and shows why what our
colleagues believe to be true is (at least in a suitable approximation) true from a quantum
perspective. We should be able to say to the neurophysiologists, “Your way of talking about
things, while not the language of quantum mechanics, is a quite adequate approximation
to what results from a fully quantum-mechanical description of the sort we physicists know
how, in principle, to construct, but which is extremely awkward and ill-suited to your pur-
poses. You really don’t need it, because your talk about axons, synapses, contact potentials,
and the like makes good physical sense, and is in agreement with our understanding of the
quantum nature of the world. Stop worrying about Penrose. Instead, go solve your problems
in the way that seems sensible to you. You have our blessing.”
Alas, the Ithaca interpretation cannot pronounce such a blessing, because “correlations
without correlata” has the wrong correspondence limit. There is nothing that allows it to
distinguish big macroscopic systems with enormous Hilbert spaces from microscopic spin
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systems. The same sorts of contradictions can arise for the former as for the latter, and
thus, in the Ithaca interpretation, the probabilities of macroscopic properties make sense,
but the properties themselves do not exist. This immediately raises the question of why our
colleagues (not to mention we ourselves) believe in the existence of axons and chairs and the
like, while supposing that probabilities are abstract, unphysical things — exactly opposite to
the real state of affairs according to the Ithaca interpretation. In this manner the problem of
consciousness, in the form of the mistaken beliefs of a large part of the scientific community,
not to mention the rest of the human race, is immediately dragged onto center stage in a
fashion which I find bizarre.
Mermin devotes a significant amount of space in Ref. 2 to the problem of consciousness:
it comes up in Secs. II and X, and all of IV is devoted to this topic. He does not claim to
understand it, and considers it a significantly more difficult problem than quantum interpre-
tation. I shall not try to either summarize or dispute his ideas, as this would require a rather
lengthy essay on a topic for which I possess little expertise. What he writes does not indicate
that he has managed to cleanly separate consciousness theory and quantum theory. Instead
his strategy, as I understand it, is to plunge ahead in his effort to understand the quantum
mechanical description of the nonconscious world while leaving inconsistencies between con-
sciousness and his doctrine of the nonexistence of correlata to be solved at some later date.
To be sure, his is a new theory, and if no one could propose a new theory without first solving
all the outstanding problems, nothing would get published. Theoretical physicists are in the
habit of issuing promissory notes against the day when loose ends will be properly tied down.
If I am hesitant to accept such a note, it is not because I doubt Mermin’s honesty. On the
contrary, it is because I believe him when he says that consciousness is a much more difficult
problem than quantum mechanics. Which is why the latter needs to be cleanly separated
from the former if we are to make progress, and it seems to me that the Ithaca interpretation
does not accomplish this.
But can quantum historians do any better? The answer is a qualified “Yes”. First, and
this needs no qualification, the ontological ordering of properties and probabilities in the
histories approach is the same as in classical physics. Properties correspond to subspaces
of the Hilbert space, the counterparts of subsets of a classical phase space, and this is
how classical physics describes real physical properties. Probabilities of properties represent
partial information about the system in cases in which more information is at least potentially
available (more on this in Sec. 4.2). Thus the Ithaca interpretation’s insistence on the
unreality of things most people consider real is absent from the histories approach, along
with the accompanying temptation to start discussing consciousness.
Second, and this does need qualification, the histories approach has an appropriate corre-
spondence limit. How the classical world emerges from quantum theory has been studied by
Gell-Mann and Hartle,(14) Brun,(26, 27) and Omne`s.(8) While I myself have not participated in
this work, I have tried to summarize the main ideas in Ch. 26 of Ref. 12. Here is a quick sum-
mary of that summary. Classical physics emerges when you use a quasi-classical framework
for quantum theory. It employs appropriate projectors, or families of projectors, on (typi-
cally rather large) subspaces chosen so that they represent the properties of “macroscopic”
(i.e., in comparison with elementary particles) objects used in everyday discourse, including
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scientific discourse when it is not focused on the specifically quantum aspects of matter. A
quasi-classical framework is an authentic quantum mechanical description of the world, no
more and no less than the unitary or the dragon or the practical frameworks of Sec. 3.2.
A key point is that a single quasi-classical framework suffices for answering all “classical”
questions about the world. (Actually there are many different, mutually incompatible quasi-
classical frameworks which yield descriptions which are indistinguishable at the macroscopic
level; for present purposes we can simply think of using one of these.) All probabilities which
arise in this framework, and thus all the probabilities needed for classical physics, can be
dealt with using ordinary probability theory, without worrying about inconsistencies of the
type that appear in (4).
The qualification is that actual demonstrations that classical physics emerges in this
fashion are technically quite difficult, as you can see by looking at Refs. 14 and 28. We have
a general idea of how the scheme should work, along with some specific calculations to back
it up. No nasty surprises have emerged thus far. But until you have searched the forest you
cannot be sure there are no dangerous animals lurking there, and the emergence of classical
physics from the quantum world covers a lot of territory still under exploration.
4.2 Density matrices as fundamental and objective
The second pillar of the Ithaca interpretation is that the density matrix is a fundamental
objective property, and provides a complete description of a single quantum system. Mermin
regards this as a consequence of desideratum 5, Einstein locality: if A and B are two systems
far enough apart so that they are not interacting, nothing done to B should have any effect on
A. It is helpful to consider a specific case: two spin-half particles a and b in an entangled spin-
singlet state |ψ〉. The reader probably knows how this is usually discussed: a measurement of
Sbz for particle b that yields a value of +1/2 results in the wave function somehow collapsing
into a state |z−a 〉, Saz = −1/2, for particle a, while the measurement outcome Sbz = −1/2
will produce |z+a 〉. On the other hand a measurement of Sbx will result in a collapse with
Sax = −Sbx, and so forth. Taken literally, this description seems to imply long-range nonlocal
influences that alter (or produce) the state of particle a depending upon the choice and the
outcome of the measurement on particle b. Einstein did not like such nonlocal influences,
and Mermin and I share his distaste. But what to do about them?
One thing you can do is calculate the reduced density matrix using a partial trace over
particle b,
ρa = Trb([ψ]), (6)
where [ψ] is short for |ψ〉〈ψ|. It is then easy to show that if nothing is perturbing particle
a — no magnetic field, no measurement — the choice of which measurement is made on
particle b has no effect on ρa. Hence if ρa tells us everything that can possibly be said about
the internal properties of particle a, these cannot be changed by what is done to particle b,
and Einstein locality as defined in desideratum 5 will be satisfied. By an internal property
I mean something like the value of Saz, while Mermin means the corresponding probability
distribution. On the other hand, the correlation between particles a and b that tells one
that Saz = −Sbz is not an internal property and cannot be deduced from ρa.
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Arguments supporting the idea that its reduced density matrix provides a complete
description of the internal properties of a subsystem are given Sec. 3 of Ref. 1, and are the
central focus of Ref. 3. The discussion is based on the formula
ρ =
∑
j
pj [ψj ] (7)
expressing a density matrix ρ as a sum over terms corresponding to an “ensemble” {pj , |ψj〉},
where {pj} is a collection of probabilities, and {|ψj〉} a collection of normalized, in general
nonorthogonal, pure states. If ρ is not a pure state there are (infinitely) many inequivalent
ensembles that can be used to represent it in the form (7), and if these ensembles can in
some sense be regarded as physically distinct, then the density matrix by itself is not telling
us all there is to know. In particular, believers in nonlocal influences will associate an
ensemble {|z+a 〉, |z
−
a 〉}, equal probabilities, with the reduced density matrix ρa when a and
b are in a spin singlet state and Sbz is measured on particle b. That is, either Saz = +1/2
or Saz = −1/2 with the same probability, and we cannot say which since we are only
considering particle a in isolation, not as something correlated with the outcome of the Sbz
measurement. On the other hand, if Sbx is measured, the resulting ensemble is {|x
+
a 〉, |x
−
a 〉}.
In this perspective these ensembles represent distinct states of affairs, despite the fact that no
measurement carried out on a can reveal the difference. (For this reason nonlocal influences
cannot be used to transmit information, a point which has received significant attention in
the published literature. See, for example, Sec. 4.6 of Ref. 29.) Mermin, on the other hand,
does not believe that there are any objective difference between the two ensembles in this
and other analogous cases, and his discussion of the topic in Ref. 3 combines the wit and
wisdom for which he is justly famous. I see no point in trying to repeat or summarize it in
my own dull words. Instead, I call an intermission during which the reader who has not yet
done so can take time to read and enjoy the dialogue between Yvonne and Zygmund!
My own assessment of Mermin’s argument is that while it represents a good first step in
defending Einstein locality, one can do a lot better, but in order to do a lot better one needs
to abandon the idea that the density matrix of a subsystem is an objective and irreducible
description, and instead treat it as a quantum analog of a classical probability distribution,
something you use when the information available to you is less than what is, in principle,
potentially available. I shall (of course) be using histories to discuss the situation, and
for this purpose it is helpful to allow for a time dependent |ψ(t)〉 obtained by integrating
Schro¨dinger’s equation starting with an initial entangled state |ψ(0)〉 at t = 0. The time
dependence comes from a Hamiltonian in which there is no interaction between the two
particles, but one or both of them could be in a magnetic field. For most of the discussion I
will assume zero magnetic field, so that |ψ(t)〉 is the same as the initial |ψ(0)〉.
The probability that Saz = +1/2 at time t can be written as
Pr(Saz = +1/2) = 〈ψ(t)|
(
[z+a ]⊗ I
)
|ψ(t)〉 = Tra
(
ρa(t)[z
+
a ]
)
, (8)
where ρa(t) is defined by the time-dependent version of (6). The event algebra on which this
probability is defined must include [z+a ] and its negation [z
−
a ], and the coarsest (smallest)
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sample space for which this is true consists of these two projectors. This sample space does
not contain [ψ(t)], and it is inconceivable that it could somehow be extended to include
[ψ(t)], because [ψ(t)] does not commute with [z+a ] or [z
−
a ]: the projector onto any entangled
state of two spin-half particles does not commute with that for any nontrivial property of
either spin. Hence it is meaningless to think of the two-spin system as somehow being in
the entangled state |ψ(t)〉 when at that t one uses |ψ(t)〉 to compute the probability (8).
The careless habit of physicists in thinking that one can ascribe properties to separate spins
while believing that the combination is in an entangled state is, from the perspective of the
quantum historian, just that — a careless habit, which can and does get people into trouble.
But if |ψ(t)〉 is not a physical property, how can it appear in (8)? In this context it
functions not as a physical property or quantum beable, but as a mathematical device to
assist calculation, a pre-probability in the notation of Sec. 9.4 of Ref. 12, to which I refer the
reader for a detailed discussion. If |ψ(t)〉 in (8) is merely a device for calculation and not
a physical property, the same must be true of ρa(t). (Note that ρa(t) is not really needed,
since anything one can calculate from it can be obtained just as well from |ψ(t)〉, and one
can use |ψ(t)〉 to compute other things, such as the correlation between the two particles,
which can’t be obtained from ρa(t).) Thus ρa(t) is a pre-probability and cannot be more
real than a probability, so in the histories approach it is not a beable. Note once again how
real vs. imaginary gets reversed when one goes from Ithaca to histories.
Unlike Mermin, the historian claims that a more refined, more precise, more informative
description of particle a is available, at least in principle, than that provided by ρa. For the
spin singlet state, ρa assigns probabilities of 1/2 to each of the two possible values of Saz. This
is very little information, and corresponds to not knowing the outcome of a coin toss. How
can we do better? By measuring Saz using a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, and seeing whether
its value is +1/2 or −1/2. Alas, you say, the measurement will perturb the particle and the
outcome will not tell us whether Saz was +1/2 or −1/2 before the measurement. You will
indeed learn nothing if you insist on using the dragon framework, Sec. 3.2, that you learned
from your textbook. Instead use an appropriate framework, the same thing experimental
physicists do when they design real apparatus to measure real properties. They are not fools!
Having reduced Mermin’s irreducible description, can we still defend Einstein locality?
Indeed we can, with a much more robust and compelling argument than Mermin’s. For one
can show — see Ch. 23 of Ref. 12 for the detailed justification — that if at time t1 particle a
has, for example Saz = +1/2, and at t2 > t1 some spin component (it doesn’t matter which
one) of particle b is measured, then at any time t3 > t1, including t3 > t2, it is still the case
that Saz = +1/2. (This assumes that particle a is not in a magnetic field.) You can replace
Saz = +1/2 with Saw = +1/2, where w is any direction in space, and result is the same: the
distant measurement leaves it unchanged. In brief, the historian can carry out an explicit
calculation that demonstrates Einstein locality. And as a corollary provides a very simple
proof that nonlocal influences cannot transport information: they don’t exist!
This argument is not available to Mermin, who thinks Saz = +1/2 is meaningless. How-
ever, a modified form can be constructed for someone who only believes in correlations. The
fact that nothing happens to Saz when b is measured at t2 can be expressed using joint
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probabilities
Pr([z+a ], t3; [z
−
a ], t1) = 0,
Pr([z−a ], t3; [z
+
a ], t1) = 0.
(9)
which are easily calculated using histories, see Ch. 23 of Ref. 12 for the general strategy. I
myself find it a bit clearer to write
Pr([z+a ], t3 | [z
+
a ], t1) = 1,
Pr([z−a ], t3 | [z
−
a ], t1) = 1,
(10)
but (9) can be used by someone suspicious of conditionals.
However, there is no way to derive either (9) or (10) from |ψ(t)〉 or from the reduced
density matrix ρa(t). This seems to have escaped people who suppose that the “wave function
of the universe”, thought of as a function of time satisfying Schro¨dinger’s equation, somehow
provides a complete description of the time dependence of a quantum system. One way to
see why this is not so is to use the classical analogy of a Brownian particle that starts at the
origin at t = 0. The usual simplified theory leads to a probability distribution density
ρ(r, t) = (4piDt)−3/2 exp[−r2/4Dt], (11)
for the Brownian particle to be located at a point r at time t, where r is the magnitude of
r and D is the corresponding diffusion constant. This ρ(r, t) provides a useful probabilistic
description, something that can be checked against experiments. But even on a probabilistic
level there is more that can be said. Suppose that at time t1 = 5 seconds the particle is at
r1. Then at t = 5+∆t seconds the probability of its location conditional on this information
will not be given by (11), but by a different expression involving r − r1 and ∆t. The point
is that you cannot use the single time-dependent expression (11) to describe what is going
on, for it lacks information about correlations of positions at different times. Clearly (11)
does not describe the motion of an individual Brownian particle. It is more appropriately
thought of as describing an ensemble: a collection of many Brownian particles, or the results
of repeating an experiment on one Brownian particle many times.
In the same way, ρa(t) in our quantum example is missing the sort of information needed
to derive (9) or (10). That Saz has a probability of 1/2 of being + at both t1 and t3 is
consistent with its being the same at both times, (9), but also with its having reversed its
sign at some point during the intervening time interval, say at t2 when the measurement
was carried out on particle b. There is nothing wrong with ρa(t), but it simply is not an
appropriate tool for calculating correlations of properties at different times. The same com-
ments apply to |ψ(t)〉. Quantum histories, on the other hand, are an appropriate tool, and
for this reason satisfy Mermin’s desideratum 3, which says we should be able to describe the
behavior of individual systems even in cases in which the theory cannot provide deterministic
predictions. The Ithaca interpretation, at least as long as it relies on ρa(t) or |ψ(t)〉, cannot
obtain (9), and is limited to what I think is best thought of, using the analogy between ρa(t)
and ρ(r, t), an ensemble rather than a single system description.
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5 Reality and Its Representations
Mermin has a brief discussion of quantum histories in Sec. XI of Ref. 2. In a footnote
he remarks that the term incompatible as used in the histories approach has something in
common with Bohr’s complementary, and he thinks it would be better if the latter were
used in place of the former. My response is that while there is a relationship between the
concepts, there is also a risk of confusion, a point to which I shall return below. Mermin goes
on to say that the histories approach liberates Bohr’s complementarity from the context of
mutually exclusive experimental arrangements, and then adds:
The price that one pays for this liberation is that the paradoxical quality of
complementarity is stripped of the protective covering furnished by Bohr’s talk
of mutually exclusive experimental arrangements, and laid bare as a vision of a
single reality about which one can reason in a variety of mutually exclusive ways,
provided one takes care not to mix them up. Reality is, as it were, replaced by a
set of complementary representations, each including a subset of the correlations
and their accompanying correlata. In the consistent histories interpretation it is
rather as if the representations have physical reality but the representata do not.
The last sentence is at first glance rather perplexing, as the historian’s motto of “no
probabilities without a sample space” translates into “no correlations without correlata,”
which would seem to correspond to “no representations without representata,” the exact
opposite of what Mermin asserts. I am indebted to him for the following clarification:(30)
“representations” are frameworks in histories terminology, and the denial of physical reality
to the representata was intended to refer to the impossibility of combining sample spaces of
separate incompatible frameworks into a single sample space. Even with this clarification
I find myself in almost complete disagreement with Mermin’s statement, and since the is-
sues involved are rather central to a correct interpretation of the histories approach, I shall
attempt to briefly state my own position on the relationship of frameworks to the physical
reality they in some sense represent.
To begin with, only a very naive realism would assert that the mathematical constructs
used in theoretical physics are identical with the physical world which many of us believe is
“out there,” independent of our attempts to describe it, and to a great extent immune to our
efforts to change it. Instead, our theories are, at best, abstract mathematical representations
of that reality. Electrons do not solve Schro¨dinger’s equation, protons do not live in Hilbert
space, and even in the pre-quantum era planets did not move on orbits in phase space. The
relationship of our mathematical and conceptual structures to the world “out there” is a
subtle and difficult philosophical problem. My attitude, perhaps better my faith, is that
reality is something like our best scientific models of the world. In particular, a Hilbert
space of wave packets and spins, while it is only an abstract model, reflects reality better
than does a classical phase space.
The phase space is not so much wrong as outdated, and it served very well as a repre-
sentation of physical reality into the early 20th century. Since a point in phase space comes
as close as possible to representing or describing a classical system as we think it “really
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is,” it seems sensible to assign the same task to a ray in Hilbert space, the closest quantum
analog of a point in phase space. The ray is, in this sense, a mathematical representation
of what I believe, but cannot prove, is the reality “out there” in an objective world. This
connection between the quantum Hilbert space and the real world, which seems to me central
to the physical interpretation of quantum histories, is what is being denied by the Ithaca
interpretation’s “correlations without correlata.”
Let us return to the problem which seems behind Mermin’s denial that the histories
approach provides a consistent representation of reality: the fact that incompatible sample
spaces cannot be combined. Part of the difficulty may be that “incompatible” used in this
way is a technical quantum term referring to something with no good classical analog. In
particular, it means something very different from “mutually exclusive” as applied to distinct
elements of a classical (or quantum) sample space. Various critics have confused these two
terms and thereby seriously misunderstood what the histories approach is all about, and
this is one reason I do not think it is a good idea to replace “incompatible” with Bohr’s
“complementary”, at least insofar as the latter is associated (Bohr was hardly a model of
clarity) with mutually exclusive pieces of apparatus. The following comments will, I hope,
help clarify the difference; lengthier discussions will be found elsewhere (Ref. 11 and Ch. 27
of Ref. 12).
For a spin-half particle, Sx and Sz are incompatible observables, and the projectors [z
+]
and [x+] represent incompatible properties, since [z+][x+] is not zero and not equal to [x+][z+].
In order to measure Sx for a particle traveling along the y axis one needs to rotate the Stern-
Gerlach apparatus through 90◦ from the orientation needed to measure Sz, and these two
are mutually exclusive experimental arrangements, as are any two macroscopically-distinct
states of affairs when viewed quantum mechanically: the product of the projectors is zero.
Note that [z+] and [x+] do not and cannot belong to a single quantum framework, whereas
the two orientations of the apparatus can and do belong to a single quasi-classical framework.
For this reason, measurements, while they can supply useful insights, are not a good, or at
least an adequate way to try and understand quantum incompatibility. Instead, one has
to build up one’s intuition on the basis of microscopic quantum examples analyzed in a
consistent way that is not dependent upon a notion of macroscopic measurement. To this
end I recommend toy models of the sort used extensively in Ref. 12.
Even though there is no really good classical analog of quantum incompatibility — which
is why it is so hard to get it straight — judicious use of classical models, such as the following,
can sometimes help. Imagine a spinning object with angular momentum (Lx, Ly, Lz), and
suppose that for some reason I describe it by giving the value of Lz and not that of the other
two components. Such an impoverished description constitutes the Lz framework, and Lx
and Ly frameworks are defined in the same way. Using the Lz framework doesn’t mean one
cannot use the Lx framework, and whether or not some Lz description is true has no bearing
on whether an Lx description is true. Clearly no “law of nature” tells one that one of these
frameworks is “correct” and the others are “incorrect.” Instead, if it is the z component of
angular momentum that interests me, I will need to use the Lz framework, because in the Lx
and Ly frameworks Lz is (obviously) not defined. Also I can, if I wish, use the Lz framework
up to some point in time, and then switch over to the Lx framework for later times without
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altering the angular momentum of the body; all I have done is switch my attention from one
aspect to another.
Now consider a quantum spin-half particle with its Sx, Sy, and Sz frameworks. Every
statement in the preceding paragraph is still correct if L is replaced by S! Go back and read
it over again with this in mind. The difference between classical and quantum is that you
cannot combine two incompatible quantum descriptions, so specifying values of both Sx and
Sz for the same particle at the same time is meaningless, whereas the classical descriptions are
always compatible and therefore always combinable. This is why the discussion of classical
angular momentum in the previous paragraph seems so unnatural, even though it is correct:
in classical physics one never has any reason to talk about Lz while not talking about Lx
and Ly. The situation in quantum physics is different, but it is nonetheless misleading to
think of the Sx and Sz descriptions as mutually exclusive, as if one being true implies that
the other is false. Which framework is to be used depends on the sort of description the
theoretical physicist wants to construct. He is of course perfectly free to construct all sorts
of incompatible descriptions and contemplate them in any way he finds helpful in better
understanding the quantum world. However, he will be badly mistaken if he thinks he can
combine two of them into a single description that somehow corresponds to the reality of
what is going on in his colleague’s laboratory. This may be something of what Bohr had
in mind when he spoke of “complementarity,” and I would like to believe that it is. But if
so, anchoring the concept firmly in the mathematical structure of Hilbert space rather than
tying it to possible arrangements of macroscopic apparatus is a necessary step in producing
a tool of real utility to the quantum physicist, something that can go beyond the usual
arm-waving appeal to the uncertainty principle and be used to disentangle something like
Hardy’s paradox.
A particularly important framework for understanding the histories approach to quantum
reality is the quasi-classical framework mentioned earlier, the one appropriate for describing
the everyday world. As already noted in Sec. 4.1, this framework provides what is in prin-
ciple (it would, obviously, be hideous to use it in practice) a genuine quantum-mechanical
description of how things develop in time, using histories based on projectors representing
actual properties of the world. The dynamics is stochastic, and only one of the histories to
which quantum mechanics assigns probabilities will correspond to what actually happens.
But what actually happens actually happens, and in this respect the histories approach pro-
vides a robust realism in marked contrast to the Ithaca interpretation. What about MQS
states, Schro¨dinger’s cat? There are certainly frameworks which contain such things, and
no law (in particular, no law of nature) prevents physicists from using them. Think of such
a framework as describing the “Sx” aspect of the world in a situation in which the quasi-
classical framework describes the “Sz” aspect. These descriptions are not mutually exclusive
in the sense that if one is correct the other must be false. Think again of classical Lz and Lx.
But you cannot combine them, for attempting to do so produces something which doesn’t
live in the Hilbert space.
Returning to the topic of physical reality as viewed quantum mechanically, it seems to
me rather natural to allow it to include everything that can be described by a quasi-classical
framework, with the obvious proviso appropriate for a stochastic theory: only one of the
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histories actually occurs. This way everything that is part of reality in macroscopic classical
physics has a quantum counterpart. Including other quantum frameworks on an equal footing
as possible or potential descriptions of physical reality is then a natural idea, and there seems
to be nothing wrong with it so long as one keeps in mind that quantum reality understood
in this way is such that its diverse incompatible aspects cannot be represented by a single
picture of the world in the manner we are accustomed to in classical physics. To be sure,
one may also take the position that unless the frameworks (representations) satisfy classical
combination rules, what they represent cannot count as part of genuine physical reality.
If this is Mermin’s position, I disagree with him, for I believe that the most interesting
developments of modern science are precisely those that have caused significant changes in
our view of reality, and quantum mechanics belongs on that list.
6 Conclusion
The Ithaca interpretation and the histories approach share a common vision of what con-
stitutes a good interpretation of quantum mechanics. As indicated in Sec. 1, I agree whole-
heartedly with the first five of Mermin’s six desiderata, and for reasons which I have alluded
to from time to time in this paper, I believe the histories approach, as summarized in Sec. 3.1
satisfies all five. On the other hand, it seems to me that the Ithaca interpretation is deficient
in two respects.
The first and most serious problem is connected with the first desideratum: The theory
should describe an objective reality independent of observers and their knowledge. If words
are to have their usual meaning, “reality” must somehow be connected with what most
people, including most quantum physicists, think constitutes the real world, with its chairs
and photomultiplier tubes and neurons and the like. And most of us think that the actual
outcome of a coin flip — it came up tails on this particular occasion — is more real than
the probability of 1/2 assigned to it before the experiment took place. But Mermin claims,
if I have not misunderstood him, that in the quantum world probabilities are real and their
referents are not; my difficulties with this are explained in Sec. 4.1.
To be sure, the quantum world may be sufficiently different from the world of everyday
experience that words cannot have their usual meaning, and I think this must to some extent
be the case. All of the great revolutions of modern science have required some revision of
the meaning of words. Think of how our notion of “time” was altered by relativity theory.
It would be disappointing if quantum mechanics, which is surely much more revolutionary
than relativity, did not require similar changes. In Sec. 2.1 I explain why the use of Hilbert
space rather than phase space mathematics in quantum theory raises crucial issues about
how we reason about the world, and in Secs. 2.2 and 3 some proposals for dealing with this. I
can hardly criticize innovation when the histories approach that I advocate requires a major
revision of “classical” ways of thinking when dealing with the quantum world.
However, quantum logic, quantum histories, and Copenhagen or textbook quantum me-
chanics (at least when viewed from a histories perspective) have in common the fact that in
the correspondence limit of macroscopic systems their vision of reality corresponds, pretty
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much, to what we believe about the ordinary world. The Ithaca interpretation does not.
This does not by itself mean that it is wrong: remember that Galileo’s opponents thought it
obvious that the earth was at rest, whereas we have come to accept the fact that it is, instead,
in rapid motion. But it does mean that a lot more work needs to be done to make sense out
of the Ithaca interpretation, and if a theory of consciousness is needed in order to explain
why the commonsense view of reality is wrong, I am rather pessimistic about the project. At
least we need to explore the possibility that quantum mysteries can be satisfactorily solved
in a less radical manner.
The other deficiency I see in the Ithaca interpretation has to do with desideratum 3: The
theory should describe individual systems — not just ensembles. Here the issues are more
subtle. The histories approach is capable, Sec. 4.2, of providing a more detailed description
of the properties of one of the two particles prepared in an entangled state than is possible
using a reduced density matrix, contrary to Mermin’s claim that the latter is objective and
irreducible. To use an analogy, the historian is willing to say that the outcome of this
particular coin toss was T , whereas Mermin can only assign equal probabilities to H and T .
I myself have no problem with assigning a probability to a particular event, such as whether
or not it will snow in Ithaca on December 25 of 2010. But it seems to me that such an
assignment does not really describe the event, and by analogy the reduced density matrix
does not describe an individual system, even though it may supply us with some useful
information. And to the extent that a reduced density matrix ρa(t) is the quantum analog
of the Brownian particle probability distribution in (11), it seems appropriate to think of it
as describing an ensemble rather than an individual system.
I would agree that the Ithaca interpretation satisfies the other desiderata: it describes
small systems, measurements do not play a fundamental role, and it preserves Einstein
locality. In the case of Einstein locality (Sec. 4.2) it seems to me that the histories approach
achieves sharper results, but at least Mermin and I agree on the absence of those mysterious
nonlocal influences.
The Ithaca interpretation is much younger than the histories approach, and Mermin is
quite frank in acknowledging that his notion of objective probability is tentative, and that
there are a number of other unresolved problems and loose ends; see in particular Sec. XII
of Ref. 2. These will need to be tied down a bit better before one can say whether or
not this approach is really effective in taming quantum mysteries. In the meantime the
histories interpretation shows that the vision represented by his first five desiderata is not
just wishful thinking on Mermin’s part. There is already one consistent interpretation of
quantum mechanics that fits the bill, and it will be interesting to see if this can also be
done in a completely different way. It is high time to clean up the conceptual mess which
has produced such headaches for physicists (I am particularly concerned about beginning
students), and served as a breeding ground for all manner of crazy philosophical oddities.
Even if Mermin and I do not agree on how to accomplish this, we seem to share a remarkably
similar vision of what the result ought to look like when the task is complete.
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